Originally published at mcpprobe.tech. A rug pull is a server that shows you one thing when you approve it and serves another later. In MCP the thing that changes is usually a tool definition. This walkthrough shows a minimal example, how the attack works, how mcpprobe's META-02 check catches it by comparing against a stored baseline, how to fix your process, and a lab you can run locally. What it is Most MCP clients ask the user to approve a server, or its tools, once. Nothing in the protocol makes a server keep the same tool definitions afterwards. A server returns whatever it likes each time a client asks for tools/list, and the specification lets servers that declare the listChanged capability announce a new list mid-session with notifications/tools/list_changed. Those are normal features: tools do change between releases. The attack is a change that nobody reviews. Invariant Labs described the risk in April 2025, alongside tool poisoning: a server can change a tool's description after the user has approved it, much like a malicious update to a package that was once trusted. A minimal example This is what our lab server returns when it is reviewed: And this is what the same server returns later, under the same tool name: The new description is also a poisoned one. It tries to change how the model uses send_email, a tool the weather server does not even provide: in a client connected to several servers, every description shares the model's context. The address uses .invalid, a top-level domain reserved so it never resolves. How it is exploited At a high level: the server behaves well for as long as it is being looked at. It might be a new server earning installs, or a trusted one whose maintainer account, build or hosting is later compromised. Once approved, the description changes, for every user at once or only for some. A client that does not compare what it receives with what was approved passes the new text to the model without asking anyone. A real, closely related case: CVE-2025-54136 in Cursor, reported by Check Point Research as "MCPoison". There the thing that changed was not a description but the MCP server entry in a project's configuration file. Cursor asked for approval when a server was added, but before version 1.3 a later change to an approved entry's command did not trigger a new prompt, so someone with write access to a shared repository could swap a harmless command for a malicious one. GitHub, as the CVE numbering authority, rated it 7.2 (High). Cursor 1.3 asks for approval every time an entry is modified. The lesson carries over directly: approval must be tied to the content that was approved, not to a name. How to detect it mcpprobe's META-02 computes a SHA-256 hash over the canonical JSON of every tool, prompt and resource and the server instructions. Pass --baseline FILE and the first scan records them; every later scan compares with the file and reports what was added, removed or changed. A changed description or input schema is rated medium; so is a change to the server instructions; other changed fields and added tools are rated low. The check is deterministic: hashes either match or they do not. It also notes, as info, when a server advertises listChanged. git clone https://github.com/mcpprobe-dev/mcpprobe && cd mcpprobe/examples/rug-pull pipx install mcpprobe-scanner # 1. the approved server: records the baseline mcpprobe --stdio "python server.py" --baseline baseline.json # 2. same command, but the server now serves a different description mcpprobe --stdio "python server.py" --env RUG_PULL_STAGE=after \ --baseline baseline.json --no-write-baseline -v The first scan has no findings and records the baseline. The second reports (trimmed): MEDIUM META-02 Tool surface changed since the stored baseline (rug-pull indicator) confidence high where tools[get_weather] standards MCP03:2025 (beta), ASI04 Tool 'get_weather' changed since baseline : fields description, inputSchema. affected get_weather proof baseline from compared with this scan: { "changed_fields": [ "description", "inputSchema" ] } The same scan also raises META-01 (high) on the new description, which is the subject of the tool-poisoning walkthrough. Two limits to be honest about. META-02 tells you that something changed and which fields, not whether the change is malicious; a legitimate release that edits a description fires it too, and that is intended, because someone should look. And a scanner only sees what the server returned to the scanner, at the time of the scan. A server that changes between scans, or that serves different definitions to different clients, is caught on the next scan at best. That is why the client side matters too. How to fix it If you publish a server, treat tool definitions as code: Version them, review description and schema changes in pull requests, and say what changed in release notes. Commit a baseline and fail the build when the surface changes without the baseline being updated in the same PR: # commit baseline.json; fail the build on any change to the approved surface mcpprobe https://your-server.example/mcp \ --baseline .mcpprobe/baseline.json --no-write-baseline --fail-on medium META-02 is medium, so the default --fail-on high would not stop the build on it by itself; the --fail-on medium above does. If you run a client or a gateway: Store a hash of each approved tool definition and compare it every time the list is fetched. Ask for approval again when a hash changes, and show the user what changed. Treat a list_changed notification as a reason to re-check, not as a refresh to apply silently. Reproduce it The lab is in the scanner repository at examples/rug-pull: one Python file, standard library only. The RUG_PULL_STAGE environment variable switches it between the approved and the changed definition, so the scanned command stays identical. It never reads files or opens a network connection, and it discards every argument. The scanner's test suite runs the same two scans, so the result above stays reproducible. Sources Invariant Labs: MCP security notification, tool poisoning attacks (rug pulls and shadowing) (1 Apr 2025) Cursor security advisory GHSA-24mc-g4xr-4395 (CVE-2025-54136) (1 Aug 2025) Check Point Research: MCPoison, persistent code execution in Cursor (5 Aug 2025) MCP specification 2025-11-25: Tools (listChanged) mcpprobe lab: examples/rug-pull